diff --git a/assessments/projects/external-secrets/assets/component-overview.png b/assessments/projects/external-secrets/assets/component-overview.png new file mode 100644 index 000000000..df600703b Binary files /dev/null and b/assessments/projects/external-secrets/assets/component-overview.png differ diff --git a/assessments/projects/external-secrets/assets/overview.png b/assessments/projects/external-secrets/assets/overview.png new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c5341e8ce Binary files /dev/null and b/assessments/projects/external-secrets/assets/overview.png differ diff --git a/assessments/projects/external-secrets/self-assessment.md b/assessments/projects/external-secrets/self-assessment.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..45bea057b --- /dev/null +++ b/assessments/projects/external-secrets/self-assessment.md @@ -0,0 +1,367 @@ +# Self-assessment for External Secrets Operator (ESO) + +## Table of contents + +* [Metadata](#metadata) + * [Security links](#security-links) +* [Overview](#overview) + * [Actors](#actors) + * [Actions](#actions) + * [Background](#background) + * [Goals](#goals) + * [Non-goals](#non-goals) +* [Self-assessment use](#self-assessment-use) +* [Security functions and features](#security-functions-and-features) +* [Project compliance](#project-compliance) +* [Secure development practices](#secure-development-practices) +* [Security issue resolution](#security-issue-resolution) +* [Appendix](#appendix) +* [Threat Modeling with STRIDE](#external-secrets-operator-threat-modeling) + +## Metadata + +| | | +| -- | -- | +| Software | A link to the External-Secret Operator's repository: [external-secrets](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets) | +| Security Provider | No - Primary function is to sync passwords from external secret store to k8 clusters.| +| Languages | Go, HCL, Makefile, Shell, Smarty, Dockerfile | +| SBOM | SBOM is attached to every GitHub release image (under Assets). [Link to latest release](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/releases) | +| | | + +### Security links + +| Doc | url | +| -- | -- | +| Security file | [Security.md](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/blob/main/SECURITY.md) | +| Default and optional configs | https://external-secrets.io/latest/guides/security-best-practices| + +## Overview +External Secrets Operator (ESO) is a Kubernetes operator that integrates external secret management systems like AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, Google Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, IBM Cloud Secrets Manager, CyberArk Conjur and many more. The operator reads information from external APIs and automatically injects the values into a Kubernetes Secret. + +

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+ + +### Background +The External Secrets Operator (ESO) is a tool designed for Kubernetes, a widely-used system for automating the deployment, scaling, and management of containerized applications. ESO addresses a key challenge in this domain: secure and efficient management of sensitive configuration data, known as "secrets" (like passwords, API keys, etc.). Typically, managing these secrets within Kubernetes can be complex and risky if not handled properly. ESO simplifies this by integrating Kubernetes with external secret management services (such as AWS Secrets Manager or HashiCorp Vault), which specialize in securely storing and managing these secrets. This integration not only enhances security but also streamlines the process of injecting these secrets into Kubernetes applications. + +### Actors + +#### 1. External Secret Management Systems +* Examples: AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault. +* Technical Details: These systems often employ hardware security modules (HSMs) for hardware-level encryption and secure key management. Utilize OAuth, JWT, or similar token-based authentication mechanisms, which provide robust and revocable access credentials. Feature dynamic secret creation, allowing secrets to be generated on-the-fly and automatically rotated, reducing the lifespan of any single secret. +* Isolation: Network boundaries and authentication mechanisms separate these from the Kubernetes cluster. + +#### 2. Kubernetes Cluster (including ESO) +* Role: ESO bridges Kubernetes and external secret systems. +* Integration and Communication: ESO uses the Kubernetes API to interact with the cluster, making use of client certificates for authentication or leveraging service account tokens for more granular control. +* Employs custom resource definitions (CRDs) like ExternalSecret to define how external secrets should be fetched and synchronized. +* Isolation: Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) limits potential lateral movement in case of a compromise. +* For the External Secrets Operator (ESO), the key actors based on its [architecture](https://external-secrets.io/latest/api/components/), which includes the Core Controller, the Cert Controller, and the Webhook, can be described as follows: + * Core Controller: The Core Controller is the primary component of ESO. It watches for `ExternalSecret` objects in Kubernetes and acts upon changes to these objects. It is responsible for fetching the secrets from external secret management systems and synchronizing them with Kubernetes Secrets. + * Cert Controller: The Cert Controller is responsible for managing the TLS certificates that are used for secure communication within the Kubernetes cluster, particularly for the webhook service. + * Webhook: The Webhook in ESO is used for various purposes, including mutating or validating `ExternalSecrets` and other related custom resources. It plays a critical role in ensuring the integrity and correctness of the `ExternalSecret` resources. + + +#### 3. Kubernetes Secrets +* Function: Store synchronized secrets within the cluster via ESO. +* Isolation: Kubernetes namespaces and access policies provide compartmentalization. +* Storage and Encryption: Kubernetes Secrets are, by default, stored in etcd, a distributed key-value store. Starting from Kubernetes v1.13, etcd data can be encrypted at rest. Integration with external KMS (Key Management Service) for enhanced encryption management of Secrets. +* Access Control:Secrets are often accessed via environment variables or volume mounts in Kubernetes pods, with access strictly controlled based on the pod's service account permissions. + +

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+ + +### Actions +The actions performed by ESO to synchronize secrets from external sources into Kubernetes can be outlined focusing on security checks, data handling, and interactions: + +#### 1. Client Request to External Secret Management System +ESO, acting as a client, sends a request to an external secret management system (like AWS Secrets Manager). This request includes authentication and authorization checks to ensure that ESO is permitted to access the requested secrets. + +#### 2. Retrieval of Secrets +Upon successful authentication and authorization, the external system sends the requested secrets to ESO. These secrets are transmitted over secure, encrypted channels to ensure their confidentiality and integrity. + +#### 3. Validation and Transformation +ESO validates the format and integrity of the received secrets. If necessary, it transforms the data to a format compatible with Kubernetes Secrets. + +#### 4. Synchronization to Kubernetes Secrets +ESO then creates or updates Kubernetes Secret objects with the retrieved data. This step involves interacting with the Kubernetes API server, which includes RBAC checks to ensure that ESO has the necessary permissions to perform these operations. + +#### 5. Use by Kubernetes Workloads +Applications or workloads running in Kubernetes can then access these secrets. Access to these secrets within Kubernetes is controlled by namespace-specific policies and RBAC, ensuring that only authorized workloads can retrieve them. + +To outline the actions performed by different components of the External Secrets Operator (ESO) that enable its proper functioning, we can break it down as follows: + +#### 1. Core Controller Actions: +* Monitoring: Continuously watches for ExternalSecret objects within the Kubernetes cluster. +* Secret Retrieval: Fetches secrets from external secret management systems (like AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault) based on the details specified in ExternalSecret objects. +* Data Transformation: Converts the fetched secrets into a format compatible with Kubernetes Secrets, if necessary. +* Secret Synchronization: Creates or updates corresponding Kubernetes Secret objects with the fetched data, ensuring they are in sync with the external source. + +#### 2. Cert Controller Actions: +* Certificate Generation: Automatically generates and renews TLS certificates needed for the secure functioning of webhooks. +* Certificate Management: Ensures the validity of certificates and manages their lifecycle, including storage, renewal, and revocation as required. + +#### 3. Webhook Actions: +* Request Interception: Intercepts requests related to ExternalSecret and other custom resources for validation or mutation before they are processed by the Kubernetes API server. +* Validation: Checks the integrity and correctness of ExternalSecret objects, ensuring they conform to the expected schema and standards. +* Mutation: Optionally modifies ExternalSecret objects as per predefined rules or logic to ensure they meet certain criteria or standards before processing. + + + +### Goals + +#### 1. Secure Secret Management +ESO's primary goal is to securely manage secrets within Kubernetes by leveraging external secret management systems. It ensures that sensitive information like API keys, passwords, and tokens are stored and managed in systems specifically designed for this purpose, offering robust security features. + +#### 2. Automated Synchronization +ESO automates the synchronization of secrets from these external systems into Kubernetes, ensuring that applications always have access to the latest version of each secret. + +#### 3. Access Control +By integrating with external secret managers, ESO inherits and enforces their access control mechanisms. It guarantees that only authorized parties can retrieve or modify the secrets, both in the external systems and when they are injected into Kubernetes. + +#### 4. Encryption and Integrity +ESO ensures that the transmission of secrets from external systems to Kubernetes is secure, maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of the data throughout the process. + + +### Non-goals + +#### 1. Secret Data Encryption +While ESO manages encrypted secrets, it does not provide encryption services itself. The actual encryption and decryption are handled by the external secret management systems. + +#### 2. Intrusion Detection or Prevention +ESO does not function as an intrusion detection or prevention system. It does not monitor or protect against unauthorized access within the Kubernetes cluster or the external secret systems. + +#### 3. Full Lifecycle Management of Secrets +The primary role of ESO is to synchronize secrets from external systems to Kubernetes. It does not manage the full lifecycle (like creation, rotation, and deletion) of secrets within the external systems. + +Caveat: With generators managing the full lifecycle is possible, given that the external provider allows a mechanism to do that (like with vault dynamic secrets). Example: [True Secrets Auto Rotation with ESO and Vault](https://dev.to/canelasevero/true-secrets-auto-rotation-with-eso-and-vault-1g4o). + +#### 4. Direct Security Auditing or Compliance Assurance +ESO does not perform security auditing or provide direct compliance assurance. It relies on the security and compliance features of the external secret management systems it integrates with. + +## Self-assessment use + +This self-assessment is created by the External Secrets Operator (ESO) team to perform an internal analysis of the project's security. It is not intended to provide a security audit of ESO, or function as an independent assessment or attestation of ESO's security health. + +This document serves to provide ESO users with an initial understanding of ESO's security, where to find existing security documentation, ESO plans for security, and a general overview of ESO security practices, both for the development of ESO as well as the security of ESO. + +This document provides the CNCF TAG-Security with an initial understanding of ESO to assist in a joint-assessment, necessary for projects under incubation. Taken together, this document and the joint-assessment serve as a cornerstone for if and when ESO seeks graduation and is preparing for a security audit. + + +## Security Functions and Features + +### Critical Components +* Authentication and Authorization Interface: Connects with external secret management systems; ensures only authenticated and authorized access to secrets. +* Secret Synchronization Mechanism: Securely transfers secrets from external systems to Kubernetes, critical for maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of secret data. +* Kubernetes Secrets Management: Handles the creation and updating of Kubernetes Secrets, a fundamental aspect of ensuring that only authorized Kubernetes workloads can access the synchronized secrets. + +### Security Relevant Components. +* Configuration of Secret Stores: Involves setting up SecretStore and ClusterSecretStore resources, impacting how securely ESO interacts with external systems. +* Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Configuration: Determines what resources within Kubernetes the ESO can access, significantly affecting the isolation and security of the secrets. +* Network Policies: Governs the network traffic to and from ESO, relevant for preventing unauthorized network access. + +### [Threat Modeling with STRIDE](#external-secrets-operator-threat-modeling) + +## Project Compliance + +* Compliance - No specific compliance certifications or adherence to standards like PCI-DSS, COBIT, ISO, or GDPR have been documented. + +## Secure Development Practices + +ESO has achieved a "passing" Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge +[![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/5947/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/5947). The project is working on receiving a silver badge and is in the process of meeting the criteria for it. + +### Development Pipeline + +* All source code is publicly maintained in [GitHub](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets). +* Code changes are submitted via Pull Requests (PRs) and must be reviewed and approved by at least one maintainer. +* Commits to the `main` branch are merged only when a PR is approved and passes all checks. +* Once a pull request has been opened it will be assigned to a reviewer from external-secrets/maintainers. +* ESO uses the GitHub Bot [Paul the Alien](https://github.com/apps/paul-the-alien) (which is still in Alpha) to store the list of maintainers, to approve/merge PRs and to delete branches after PR merges. +* Raising a PR triggers a series of GitHub actions and workflows whose component checks are broken down below: + * [Sonar Cloud Quality Gate](https://sonarcloud.io/project/issues?id=external-secrets_external-secrets) check initiated by the sonarcloud bot which checks for bugs, vulnerabilities, security hotspots, code smells, code coverage and duplication + * Developer Certificate of Origin (DCO) check to verify commits are signed correctly + * Detect noop ([skip-duplicate-actions](https://github.com/fkirc/skip-duplicate-actions)) + * Linting check + * Diff check + * Unit tests + * E2E tests + * Dependency License Checks (FOSSA) + * Building the image + * Image scanning for vulnerabilities using Trivy + * Create SBOM & provenance files and sign the image + * Publish signed artifacts to Dockerhub + +### Communication Channels +* Referenced in docs under [How to Get Involved](https://external-secrets.io/latest/#how-to-get-involved) and described below: + * Internal: + * Bi-weekly Development Meeting every odd week at 8:00 PM Berlin Time on Wednesday ([agenda](https://hackmd.io/GSGEpTVdRZCP6LDxV3FHJA), [jitsi call](https://meet.jit.si/eso-community-meeting)) + * [Kubernetes Slack: #external-secrets channel](https://kubernetes.slack.com/messages/external-secrets) + * [Github Issues](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/issues) + * [Github Discussions](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/discussions) + * Inbound: + * [Github Issues](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/issues) + * [Github Discussions](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/discussions) + * [Contributing Process](https://external-secrets.io/latest/contributing/process/) + * Contact Email: contact@external-secrets.io + * Outbound: + * [Twitter](https://twitter.com/ExtSecretsOptr) + +### Ecosystem +* ESO has replaced the now deprecated and archived kubernetes-external-secrets as detailed in this [issue](https://github.com/external-secrets/kubernetes-external-secrets/issues/864). It can be expected that the services that used kubernetes-external-secrets will migrate to ESO in the future. +* ESO also maintains an official list of its [Adopters](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/blob/main/ADOPTERS.md). + +## Security Issue Resolution +ESO's security policy can be found in [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/blob/main/SECURITY.md). + +### Responsible Disclosures Process +* ESO specifies that any security vulnerability found should be sent as a confidential email to contact@external-secrets.io and not be reported as an Issue. +### Vulnerability Management Plans +* ESO uses Github Security Alerts and Dependabot Dependency Updates to learn about critical software updates and security threats. +### Vulnerability Response Process +* No specific information on this is provided in the security file currently. +* Recommendation: + * Dedicated email for reporting security bugs/vulnerabilities that is monitored 24x7. + * Acknowledgement email to reporter within a reasonable time span once the process it started. + * Information on maintainers who are charged with responding to security events (in case an immediate response is required). + * Include a specific timeline/procedures to assign resources and fix a reported vulnerability. +### Incident Response +* Since this project does not directly handle any customer data, any users who experience an incident will report a vulnerability. + + +## Appendix + +### Known Issues Over Time +* ESO tracks all bugs and issues publicly at external-secrets [Github Issues](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/issues). +* No major vulnerability has been documented or disclosed to the public. + +### [CII Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/projects) +* ESO has achieved a "passing" Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) best practices badge [![OpenSSF Best Practices](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/5947/badge)](https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/5947). The project is working on receiving a silver badge and is in the process of meeting the criteria for it. + +### Case Studies +The project is still in sandbox and hasn’t recorded any specific case studies publicly. This data can be acquired from project maintainers during Part 2. + +ESO does provide a list of its official adopters in [Adopters.md](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/blob/main/ADOPTERS.md). + +A few general use cases are available below: + +* Use Case 1: Managing secrets for multiple environments + + A company has multiple environments for their applications, such as development, staging, and production. They use different credentials for each environment to access external resources, such as databases and cloud storage. ESO can be used to automatically synchronize these credentials to the appropriate Kubernetes secrets for each environment. This makes it easy to manage secrets and ensures that applications always have access to the correct credentials. + +* Use Case 2: Rotating secrets for security + + It is important to rotate secrets regularly to prevent unauthorized access. However, manually rotating secrets can be time-consuming and error-prone. ESO can be used to automate the rotation of secrets. ESO can be configured to fetch secrets from an external source, such as AWS Secrets Manager or HashiCorp Vault, and then store them in Kubernetes secrets. ESO can also be configured to rotate secrets on a regular basis. + +* Use Case 3: Accessing secrets from multiple sources + + A company may use multiple sources for their secrets, such as AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, and a custom secrets store. ESO can be used to access secrets from all of these sources. ESO can be configured to use different secret providers for different types of secrets. For example, ESO could be configured to use AWS Secrets Manager for database credentials and HashiCorp Vault for API keys. + +### Related Projects / Vendors +* Kubernetes External Secrets (deprecated): [kubernetes-external-secrets](https://github.com/external-secrets/kubernetes-external-secrets) is the original project kicked off by Godaddy while external-secrets is the newer one that replaced it. According to the team, KES does not have any dedicated or active maintainers at this time and is on limited life support. There were tech debts in the project that were causing issues and some of the dependencies they depended on are no longer maintained. To replace them would have required a sizeable effort. Also, KES was originally written in Javascript and the newer ESO is written in the more Kubernetes-friendly Golang. There is a [tool](https://github.com/external-secrets/kes-to-eso) available to migrate from KES to ESO. + +* CSI Secret Store - Integrates secrets stores with Kubernetes via a Container Storage Interface (CSI) volume. The Secrets Store CSI Driver `secrets-store.csi.k8s.io` allows Kubernetes to mount multiple secrets, keys, and certs stored in enterprise-grade external secrets stores into their pods as a volume. Once the Volume is attached, the data in it is mounted into the container’s file system. The differences between ESO and CSI Secret Store them are documented in this issue [comment](https://github.com/external-secrets/external-secrets/issues/478#issuecomment-964413129). + +### External Secrets Operator Threat Modeling + +ESO already has a threat-model documented at [threat-model](https://external-secrets.io/latest/guides/threat-model/). + +A seperate threat modeling using STRIDE is provided below: + +#### Spoofing + +##### Threat-01-S - Spoofing of External Secrets Operator +A malicious actor might attempt to impersonate the External System Operator (ESO) to illicitly access confidential information stored in external systems. + +##### Threat-01-S Recommended Mitigations +* Implementing mutual TLS (Transport Layer Security) ensures that both the ESO and the external secret management system authenticate each other. +* Using robust authentication mechanisms, like using API tokens or OAuth, further secure the connection, preventing impersonation. + +##### Threat-02-S - Spoofing of External Secrets +The risk of the External Secrets Operator (ESO) interacting with a fake external secret store represents a significant security threat. In such a scenario, an attacker could set up a counterfeit secret management service, mimicking legitimate services like AWS Secrets Manager or HashiCorp Vault. If ESO is deceived into connecting with this fraudulent service, it could lead to several security breaches, including the leakage of sensitive information, injection of false secrets, or disruption of secret synchronization processes. + +##### Threat-02-S Recommended Mitigations +* Certificate Verification: Implement strict SSL/TLS certificate verification for all external secret stores. This ensures that ESO establishes connections only with authenticated and validated services. +* Endpoint Validation: Configure ESO to connect only to known and verified endpoints of secret stores, possibly using allowlists for trusted URLs and IP addresses. +* Regular Auditing: Periodically audit and verify the configurations and connections of ESO to external services to detect any anomalies or changes that could indicate a security breach. + +#### Tampering + +##### Threat-03-T - Supply Chain Attacks +An attack can infiltrate the ESO container through various attack vectors. The following are some potential entry points, although this is not an exhaustive list: +* Source Threats: Unauthorized changes or inclusion of vulnerable code in ESO through code submissions. +* Build Threats: Creation and distribution of malicious builds of ESO, such as in container registries, Artifact Hub, or Operator Hub. +* Dependency Threats: Introduction of vulnerable code into ESO dependencies. +* Deployment and Runtime Threats: Injection of malicious code through compromised deployment processes. + +##### Threat-03-T Recommended Mitigations +* CI/CD Security: Secure the Continuous Integration and Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) pipeline with tools that scan for vulnerabilities and unauthorized changes. +* Dependency Management: Regularly scan and update dependencies to prevent vulnerabilities and use trusted sources for dependencies. +* Container Image Security: Utilize signed and verified container images, and scan these images for vulnerabilities. + +##### Threat-04-T - Tampering with ESO configuration files +The threat of tampering with External Secrets Operator (ESO) configuration files involves unauthorized modifications to the ESO's settings, which can lead to security breaches or malfunctioning of the system. + +##### Threat-04-T Recommended Mitigations +* File Integrity Monitoring: Implement a system that continuously monitors the ESO configuration files for unauthorized changes. This tool alerts administrators whenever a file is altered, enabling quick detection and response to tampering. +* Access Controls: Restrict access to ESO configuration files using robust access control mechanisms. Ensure that only authorized personnel have the necessary permissions to modify these files, and enforce multi-factor authentication for added security. + +#### Repudiation + +##### Threat-05-R - Unauthorized Modification Denial +An unauthorized user might modify a secret and subsequently deny their involvement. + +##### Threat-05-R Recommended Mitigations +* Implement a robust logging system that captures every interaction with the secrets, including access and modifications. The logs should record user identities, timestamps, and specific changes made to the secrets. +* Use digital signatures or similar mechanisms to ensure the integrity and non-repudiation of the log entries. +* Regular audits of these logs can help in quickly identifying and addressing unauthorized changes, thus holding users accountable for their actions. + +##### Threat-06-R - Disputing Synchronization +There could be discrepancies or disputes regarding when a secret was synchronized from the external store to Kubernetes. + +##### Threat-06-R Recommended Mitigations +* Maintaining detailed logs with precise timestamps for each synchronization event helps resolve these disputes. These logs should capture when the ESO checks for updates in external secret stores, when it retrieves updates, and when it synchronizes them to Kubernetes Secrets. +* Timestamps in these logs provide clear and indisputable evidence of the timing of each synchronization, aiding in resolving any disputes or confusion over the timing of updates. + +#### Information Disclosure + +##### Threat-07-I - Unauthorized access to cluster secrets +An attacker can gain unauthorized access to secrets by utilizing the service account token of the ESO core controller Pod or exploiting software vulnerabilities. This unauthorized access allows the attacker to read secrets within the cluster, potentially leading to a cluster takeover. + +##### Threat-07-I Recommended Mitigations +* Service Account Security: Secure the service account associated with the ESO core controller Pod. Implement minimal permissions (principle of least privilege) and regularly audit these permissions. +* Vulnerability Management: Regularly update and patch ESO to address known vulnerabilities. Use vulnerability scanning tools to proactively identify and mitigate potential weaknesses. +* Network Policies and Pod Security: Implement stringent network policies and pod security measures to restrict and control the communication to and from the ESO core controller Pod. + +#### Denial of Service (DoS) + +##### Threat-08-D - Webhook DOS +Currently, ESO generates an X.509 certificate for webhook registration without authenticating the kube-apiserver. Consequently, if an attacker gains network access to the webhook Pod, they can overload the webhook server and initiate a DoS attack. As a result, modifications to ESO resources may fail, and the ESO core controller may be impacted due to the unavailability of the conversion webhook. + +##### Threat-08-D Recommended Mitigations +* Authenticate the kube-apiserver: Ensure that the communication between ESO's webhook and the kube-apiserver is authenticated, preventing unauthorized entities from interacting with the webhook. +* Implement Rate Limiting: Introduce rate limiting on the webhook to prevent it from being overwhelmed by excessive requests. +* Network Security: Strengthen network security policies to restrict access to the webhook Pod, ensuring that only authorized traffic can reach it. + +##### Threat-09-D - Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack +An adversary could launch a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack to hijack the webhook pod, enabling them to manipulate the data of the conversion webhook. This could involve injecting malicious resources or causing a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. + +##### Threat-09-D Recommended Mitigations +To mitigate this threat, a mutual authentication mechanism should be enforced for the connection between the Kubernetes API server and the webhook service to ensure that only authenticated endpoints can communicate. + +#### Elevation of Privilege + +##### Threat-10-E - Exploiting Vulnerabilities for Higher Privileges: +Attackers might identify and exploit existing vulnerabilities in the External Secrets Operator (ESO) or the Kubernetes environment. These vulnerabilities could range from software bugs to insecure configurations, allowing attackers to gain unauthorized access or control. + +##### Threat-10-E Recommended Mitigations +* Perform regular updates and apply patches to both ESO and Kubernetes, addressing known security issues. +* Continuously monitor for new vulnerabilities and apply security patches as soon as they are released. + +##### Threat-11-E - Insufficiently Restricted User Roles +In this scenario, users or attackers exploit overly permissive or poorly configured RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) policies in Kubernetes. This can lead to unauthorized access elevation, potentially giving attackers control over sensitive operations or data. + +##### Threat-11-E Recommended Mitigations +* Implement and enforce strict RBAC policies, ensuring each role is granted only the minimum necessary permissions. +* Regularly review and audit RBAC configurations to detect and correct any excess permissions, ensuring they align with the principle of least privilege. +* Document security best practices for administrators and users on the importance of secure role configuration and management.